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THE BIN LADEN EXCEPTION 
Erik Luna 
INTRODUCTION 
On the evening of May 1, 2011, the American people learned that the 
world’s most wanted criminal—Osama bin Laden—had been killed in 
Pakistan during a covert operation by an elite U.S. military team.1  The 
news triggered spontaneous gatherings and revelry across the country.  For 
the millennium’s new generation, bin Laden had been the embodiment of 
evil—a real-life boogeyman—and, for some, “the first person I was ever 
taught to hate.”2  Many young Americans will not be able to recall life 
without a deep-seated fear of the terrorist leader and the organization he 
founded,3 all against a national backdrop of the so-called “war on terror.”  
Bin Laden’s death thus signaled the “end of an era” and progress “toward a 
safer, less violent world.”4 
After emotions settled, however, thoughts turned to the ultimate impact 
of the operation that closed “the Bin Laden decade.”5  The al Qaeda leader 
“really did a number on all of us,” wrote New York Times columnist 
Thomas Friedman.6  “Who will tell the people how deep the hole is that Bin 
Laden helped each of us dig over the last decade—and who will tell the 
people how hard and how necessary it will be to climb out?”7  The question 
appears ripe in light of recent statements by top officials.  Defense 
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TIMES, May 1, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/02/world/asia/osama-bin-laden-is-
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Secretary Leon Panetta claimed that the United States was “within reach of 
strategically defeating Al Qaeda.”8  Shortly thereafter, President Barack 
Obama announced that “Al Qaeda is under more pressure than at any time 
since 9/11” and that “more than half of al Qaeda’s leadership” had been 
taken out.9 
The time has come to begin a post-mortem examination, so to speak, of 
the damage wrought upon the United States and its people during the 
decade of bin Laden.  Some, like Friedman, have looked to the international 
consequences, including the perpetually troubled relationship among Arab 
states, Israel, and the United States, which was undoubtedly worsened by 
9/11 and its aftershock.  This colloquy contemplates an area of domestic 
concern that represents perhaps the most palpable effect of terrorism on the 
American citizenry: travel by plane.  In his contribution, Professor 
Alexander Reinert provides thoughtful analysis of Fourth Amendment 
doctrine as applied to airport security.10  Here, I hope to complement his 
piece by offering some context on terrorism, with the goal of prompting 
discussion as to whether bin Laden’s legacy will include yet another 
instance of constitutional exceptionalism. 
By definition, exceptionalism is a comparative concept involving a 
contrast among sufficiently analogous sets of values and practices, where an 
apparent anomaly or special case is subject to descriptive and normative 
assessments.11  Elsewhere, I have considered the idea of drug 
exceptionalism by examining the unique history and policy of prohibition 
and, in particular, the extraordinary treatment of drug crime by legislatures, 
law enforcement, and courts.12  The result is a sort of “drug exception” to 
the Constitution, where otherwise applicable constitutional rules do not 
seem to apply (or are watered down) in the government’s pursuit of 
contraband.13  Since 9/11, however, the exceptionalism in America’s “war 
on drugs” may have been surpassed by the new “war on terror.” 
Indeed, the very use of the term “war” in this context signifies the 
extraordinary nature of government efforts, providing a state-sponsored 
metaphor to emphasize the seriousness of the threat and the virtue of 
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NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW COLLOQUY  
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2012/3/ 232 
official actions.14  At times, the U.S. has been too heavy-handed—and 
occasionally ham-handed as well—in its approach to fighting terrorism, 
with important consequences for fundamental rights.  The government has 
engaged in, for instance, ethnic profiling and related abuses; extended, 
incommunicado detention in immigration cases; “enhanced interrogation 
techniques” (a.k.a. torture) such as water-boarding; “extraordinary 
rendition” of detainees to foreign nations known as human rights violators; 
mass wiretapping and data-collection by the National Security Agency; the 
maintenance of a quasi-penal colony in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba; and the 
extrajudicial, targeted killing of American citizens abroad.15 
The full extent of government operations in the aftermath of 9/11 may 
never be known, especially since America’s antiterrorism and 
counterterrorism16 efforts have been shrouded in secrecy and only partially 
revealed by civil rights suits or Freedom of Information Act requests, which 
the government has occasionally thwarted by invoking the “state secrets” 
privilege.17  Collectively, the government justifies the new policies on the 
basis of necessity; a claim the American public has largely accepted at face 
value.18  In terms of economic costs, the past decade has occasioned a 
trillion dollar increase in expenditures on homeland security alone.19  Bin 
Laden’s death thus provides an auspicious moment for level-headed 
assessment of these extraordinary government actions in view of the threat 
posed by terrorism. 
 
14
  Of course, the “war on terror” has involved non-metaphorical, conventional warfare in 
Afghanistan and Iraq which, in most ways, outstrip all other developments. 
15
  See, e.g., WAYNE MCCORMACK, UNDERSTANDING THE LAW OF TERRORISM 360–68 (2007); Erik 
Luna, Criminal Justice and the Public Imagination, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 71, 105–09 (2009) (link); 
Mark Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt & Robert F. Worth, Two-Year Manhunt Led to Killing of Awlaki in Yemen, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-is-
killed-in-yemen.html?pagewanted=all (link). 
16  Antiterrorism is defined as “[d]efensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals 
and property to terrorist acts,” while counterterrorism is defined as “[a]ctions taken directly against 
terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable 
to terrorist networks.” JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 1-02, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 22, 81 (2011), available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf (link). 
17  See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 302–13 (4th Cir. 2007) (dismissing a lawsuit 
regarding an “extraordinary rendition” program because of the state secrets privilege) (link); Ctr. for 
Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 937 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (denying a FOIA request 
from public interest groups seeking information about detainees in wake of 9/11) (link). 
18  See Luna, supra note 15, at 109–10. 
19  See John Mueller & Mark G. Stewart, Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, 
Benefits, and Costs of Homeland Security 2 (Mar. 20, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/MID11TSM.PDF (link). 
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I. TERRORISM AND RISK ANALYSIS 
Of principal concern here is the true nature of the danger to the United 
States: Is the menace of terrorism existential, as many government officials 
have alleged, threatening the nation’s very existence or at least jeopardizing 
the American way of life as we know it?20  Or does it present instead an 
unexceptional risk to individual citizens and the country as a whole?  The 
former might rationalize otherwise forbidden actions as a means of 
domestic self-preservation, consistent with the axiom that the Constitution 
is not a suicide pact.21  The latter, however, could not justify wholesale 
deviations from constitutional principles and practices unless the national 
compact binds weakly or not at all. 
One way to analyze such claims is to rely on methods of “risk 
assessment.”  Experts have created these methods to evaluate assorted 
dangers to human life—from industrial accidents to nuclear power—by 
considering the likelihood and consequences of a given threat and 
comparing it to standard benchmarks.  Based on the regulatory guidelines in 
various developed nations, there seems to be some agreement that a risk is 
unacceptable—and therefore may necessitate government action—if the 
annual fatality rate is greater than 1 in 10,000 or, in some cases, 1 in 
100,000.22  In contrast, a risk is acceptable—requiring no further safety 
improvements—if the annual fatality rate is 1 in 1,000,000 (or sometimes 1 
in 2,000,000).23 
In a recent article, two scholars employed risk assessment techniques 
to determine whether the threat of terrorism is, in fact, existential.  While 
the risk to Americans from cancer and traffic accidents falls within the 
lower unacceptable range (1 in 10,000), the annual fatality risk of modern 
terrorism is 1 in 3,500,000, making it a lesser threat than deer hunting, 
 
20
  See, e.g., Luna, supra note 15, at 118–21; John Mueller & Mark G. Stewart, Hardly Existential: 
Thinking Rationally About Terrorism, FOREIGN AFF., Apr. 2, 2010, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66186/john-mueller-and-mark-g-stewart/hardly-
existential?page=show (link); Jan Freeman, Existentially Speaking, BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 4, 2007, 
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2007/02/04/existentially_speaking/ (link); William 
Safire, Existential, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/08/magazine/08wwlnsafire.t.html (link). 
21
  Cf. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“There is 
danger that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will 
convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”) (link). 
22
  See, e.g., Mueller & Stewart, supra note 20. 
23
  See, e.g., id. (“Between these two ranges [i.e., acceptable and unacceptable risks] is an area in 
which risk might be considered ‘tolerable.’”).  To be sure, these thresholds are not “magical” but instead 
are the result of policy decisions by prominent agencies (e.g., the Food and Drug Administration), as 
well as legislation and court opinions.  See John D. Graham, The Legacy of One in a Million, 1 RISK IN 
PERSP. (Harvard Cntr. for Risk Analysis), Mar. 1993 (link). 
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home appliances, or drowning in a bathtub.24  To be unacceptable, the 
number of terrorist-related fatalities would have to increase exponentially, 
with the United States “experiencing attacks on the scale of 9/11 once a 
year, or 18 Oklahoma City bombings every year.”25  For these and other 
reasons, the authors concluded that terrorism is hardly an existential threat 
that would justify costly government actions to further reduce the risk. 
This assessment applies with full force to the realistic threats to 
domestic security posed by al Qaeda (or any other terrorist organization), 
which largely involve bombings and shootings using conventional 
weapons.26  Even though these acts are undoubtedly appalling, they can be 
classified as lethal but non-extraordinary crimes, not existential threats to 
the American homeland on par with a military invasion or an internal 
insurrection.27  As for the presumably apocalyptic threat of a nuclear attack, 
the key question is one of likelihood.  While it is true that al Qaeda might 
obtain a nuclear weapon (i.e., it is not impossible), several reports have 
concluded that the odds remain quite low due to, among other things, the 
difficulty of acquiring the necessary materials.28  But even if the risk of 
nuclear attack were viable, the appropriate policy stance would be to focus 
government efforts on that particular threat and not on all forms of 
terrorism.29 
The foregoing analysis can help inform an assessment of the topic of 
this colloquy: the impact of terrorism on commercial air travel.  In the wake 




  See Mueller & Stewart, supra note 20. 
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  Id. 
26
  NAT’L CONSORTIUM ON THE STUDY OF TERRORISM & RESPONSES TO TERRORISM, BACKGROUND 
REPORT: 9/11, TEN YEARS LATER 3 (2011), available at 
http://www.start.umd.edu/start/announcements/BackgroundReport_10YearsSince9_11.pdf (link). 
27
  See Luna, supra note 15, at 134–36. 
28
  See NAT’L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, GLOBAL TRENDS 2025: A TRANSFORMED WORLD 61–62 
(2008), available at http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_2025/2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf (link); 
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., HOMELAND SECURITY THREAT ASSESSMENT: EVALUATING THREATS 
2008–2013, at 5–6 (link); FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS OF THE 
ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR TERRORISM INVOLVING 
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 21 (2002); see also DANIEL GARDNER, THE SCIENCE OF FEAR 252–
58 (2008) (questioning the likelihood of terrorists obtaining weapons of mass destruction); JOHN 
MUELLER, ATOMIC OBSESSION: NUCLEAR ALARMISM FROM HIROSHIMA TO AL-QAEDA (2010) 
(challenging the alleged threat of nuclear annihilation and, in particular, the prospect of terrorists 
obtaining nuclear weapons). But see ROLF MOWATT-LARSSEN, AL QAEDA WEAPONS OF MASS 
DESTRUCTION THREAT: HYPE OR REALITY? 7 (2010), available at 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/al-qaeda-wmd-threat.pdf (link). 
29
  See, e.g., Jeffrey Goldberg & Marc Ambinder, The Ally from Hell, THE ATLANTIC, Dec. 2011, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/12/the-ally-from-hell/8730/ (reporting on questions 
about the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal) (link). 
106: 230 (2012) The Bin Laden Exception 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2012/3/ 235 
[L]et us assume that each week one commercial aircraft 
were hijacked and crashed.  What are the odds that a person 
who goes on one trip per month would be in that plane?  
There are currently about 18,000 commercial flights a day, 
and if that person’s trip has four flights associated with it, 
the odds against that person’s being on a crashed plane are 
about 135,000 to 1.  If there were only one hijacked plane 
per month, the odds would be about 540,000 to 1.30 
 
Even under these hyperbolic conditions, the theoretical risk to the 
individual flier is still just a fraction of the real risk to the individual driver.  
The nation’s failure to appreciate comparative risks can produce perverse 
results.  One study estimated that 1500 people died in the year after 9/11 
because Americans moved from the safest form of travel (flying) to the 
most dangerous (driving) in order to avoid the fate of those who perished 
during the terrorist attacks.31  A later study questioned these findings, only 
to offer another disturbing sequence of events: instead of additional road 
miles, the proximate cause for increased fatalities was heightened stress 
among those living in the Northeast, adjacent to the site of the attacks, who 
used and abused drugs and alcohol at a higher rate after 9/11, affecting road 
safety.32  Either way, Americans were acting contrary to their individual and 
collective interests. 
Why would presumably rational actors behave in this manner?  The 
answer is that people are not always rational, at least as the term is 
conceived in the classical microeconomic model.33  Fear and other intensely 
negative emotions can affect public policy by distorting the perception of 
 
30
  Michael L. Rothschild, Terrorism and You—The Real Odds, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2001, at B7; 
see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 97 (2005) (“[I]f 
it is estimated that the United States will suffer at least one terrorist attack each year with the same 
number of deaths as on September 11, the risk of death from terrorism is about .001 percent . . . .”). 
31
  GARDNER, supra note 28, at 3; Gerd Gigerenzer, Out of the Frying Pan into the Fire: Behavioral 
Reactions to Terrorist Attacks, 26 RISK ANALYSIS 347, 350 (2006). 
32
  See Jenny C. Su et al., Driving Under the Influence (of Stress): Evidence of a Regional Increase 
in Impaired Driving and Traffic Fatalities After the September 11 Terrorist Attacks, 20 PSYCH. SCI. 59, 
64 (2009).  Another example of perverse collective public behavior in response to fears of terrorism was 
the use of prescription antibiotics to treat anthrax (e.g., ciprofloxacin), which was unnecessary and even 
harmful due to adverse reactions and increased antibiotic resistance.  See, e.g., U.S. Food and Drug 
Admin., Information on Cipro (Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride) for Inhalation Anthrax for Consumers: 
Questions and Answers, (Nov. 14, 2001), 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/EmergencyPreparedness/BioterrorismandDrugPreparedness/ucm130711.htm 
(“Random prescribing and extensive use of Cipro could speed up the development of drug-resistant 
organisms, and the usefulness of Cipro as an antibiotic may be lost.”) (link). 
33
  See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3–4 (8th ed. 2011). 
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risk and the evaluation of potential responses.34  In particular, low-
probability risks that are perceived to be catastrophic, uncontrollable, and 
distributively inequitable—so-called “dread risks,”35 such as the supposed 
dangers of nuclear power—tend to engender higher levels of fear than risks 
that are, in truth, more likely and more lethal.
  
And because humans often 
assess risks based on mental associations, with horrific images tending to be 
associated with greater risks, media coverage can amplify such images and 
the related risk perception.  At times, this fosters mistaken beliefs that a 
consensus has been reached on the nature of a threat, the need for action, 
and the propriety of the chosen response.  Unsurprisingly, political actors 
have been inclined to exploit (or at least not question) instances of public 
emotionalism in service of their own electoral self-interests. 
The underlying risk aversion is understandable, involving a confluence 
of psychological, social, institutional, and even evolutionary factors.36  But 
it hardly makes for sound public policy, understood to be decision-making 
based on, among other things, an informed ranking of risks and a cost-
benefit analysis of possible options, all within the structural limitations of 
government and with respect for individual rights.  This public policy 
approach seeks to allocate scarce resources to increase public safety in fact, 
rather than creating the illusion of greatly enhanced security at the price of 
diverting efforts from those risks that can be meaningfully reduced.  It also 
recognizes that one of the core purposes of a constitution is to protect the 
fundamental rights of individuals and the long-term interests of society 
against rash, emotional decisions in the face of perceived perils.37 
Today, public perception of terrorism and the post-9/11 governmental 
reaction are prime examples of public policy driven by fear rather than 
rational decisionmaking.  “Terrorism” as both a word and a concept evokes 
intense, tragic images that tend to preclude rational risk assessments based 
on the available information.38  The resulting fear is exacerbated by various 
factors, including the stochastic nature of terrorism, the terrorists’ use of 
indiscriminate, lethal weapons, and their willingness to target civilians who 
lack meaningful control over the risk of attack.39  As mentioned above, the 
 
34
  See Luna, supra note 15, at 81–86; Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 22–28, 32–34 (2010) (link); see generally PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 
(2000); SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 89–107. 
35
  See Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCI. 280, 283 (1987) (link). 
36
  See Gigerenzer, supra note 31, at 348. 
37
  See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (link); THOMAS M. 
COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE 
POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 54–55 (1868) (link); F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION 
OF LIBERTY 179–80 (1960). 
38
  SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 40. 
39
  See Ben Sheppard, Mitigating Terror and Avoidance Behavior Through the Risk Perception 
Matrix to Augment Resilience, 8 J. HOMELAND SECURITY & EMERGENCY MGMT. 1, 3–4 (2011) (link). 
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federal government has responded in kind with unprecedented policies and 
practices, in terms of the resources expended and the infringements on 
individual rights. 
To be sure, al Qaeda’s threat has not disappeared, a point duly noted by 
President Obama and his national security team, as well as by foreign 
dignitaries.40  Interpol still considers al Qaeda the world’s biggest terrorist 
security threat, and it was only a year ago that London was reported as a 
possible target for a “dirty bomb” (i.e., a conventional explosive mixed with 
radioactive material).41  On this side of the Atlantic, national security 
experts and law enforcement officials have long warned about the prospect 
of an attack in the United States on or around the ten-year anniversary of 
9/11.  Thankfully, the threats never materialized.  Yet even if they had, it 
would still not justify perforce the suspension of individual rights and the 
implementation of an antiliberal program of state surveillance and control.  
Again, the critical issues for risk analysis are those of scale and probability. 
While al Qaeda undoubtedly remains a menace, it has been weakened 
in recent times and does not present an existential threat to the United 
States.42  The Obama Administration seemed to admit as much in its 
guidelines on commemorating the ten-year anniversary of 9/11: although 
terrorists “still have the ability to inflict harm, . . . Al Qaeda and its 
adherents have become increasingly irrelevant.”43  Since 9/11, the capture or 
killing of key figures in al Qaeda operations—including, of course, bin 
Laden himself—has substantially downsized the threat posed by the 
organization.44  Al Qaeda is thus a fundamentalist organization in decline, 
still bent on wreaking havoc and using fear as political tools, but incapable 
 
40
  Prime Minister David Cameron, Prime Minister: “While Bin Laden Is Gone, the Threat of Al 
Qaeda Remains,” FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE. (May 3, 2011), 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=PressS&id=591331982 (link). 
41
  Duncan Gardham, Nuclear Terror Risk to Britain from Al-Qaeda, TELEGRAPH, Mar. 22, 2010, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/7500719/Nuclear-terror-risk-to-Britain-
from-al-Qaeda.html (link); Interpol Says Al Qaeda Remains Biggest Global Threat, REUTERS, June 7, 
2011, http://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCATRE7560RE20110607 (link). 
42




  Thom Shanker & Eric Schmitt, White House Issues Guides on Sept. 11 Observances, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 29, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/30/us/politics/30terror.html?pagewanted=all (link). 
44
  See, e.g., Alison Fitzgerald, Bin Laden Death Means Most Sept. 11 Terror Conspirators Killed or 
Captured, BLOOMBERG, May 3, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-04/bin-laden-death-
means-most-sept-11-terror-conspirators-killed-or-captured.html (link); Agence France-Presse, Al-Qaeda 
Leaders Who Have Been Killed or Captured, ABS-CBN NEWS, May 2, 2011, http://www.abs-
cbnnews.com/global-filipino/world/05/02/11/al-qaeda-leaders-who-have-been-killed-or-captured (link); 
Tom A. Peter, Killing of Al Qaeda’s No. 2 a Hammer Blow to Weakening Group, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Aug. 28, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-security/2011/0828/Killing-of-
Al-Qaeda-s-No.-2-a-hammer-blow-to-weakening-group-VIDEO (link). 
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of achieving its goals,45 at least directly.  Instead, the real “existential” 
threat to the United States—the one that endangers the American way of 
life and the nation’s particular form of constitutional governance—is not al 
Qaeda itself, but political reactions to al Qaeda that trade fundamental 
liberties for the pretense of greater security. 
II. THE TSA REGIME AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Turning again to the topic of this colloquy, the airport search regime 
adopted by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) provides a 
poignant example of irrational policy responses to improbable future 
terrorist attacks.  As an initial matter, many experts anticipate that the next 
organized plot against America will involve something other than 
commercial aircraft, such as coordinated bombings in public places.46  For 
the sake of argument, however, let’s assume that al Qaeda still seeks to use 
its single most successful modus operandi, keeping in mind that 9/11 could 
and should have been prevented by government officials (i.e., it was not 
inevitable under the then-existing legal regime),47 and that the TSA’s 
actions could, at best, merely decrease the likelihood of an already minute 
chance of another 9/11-type event. 
The question, then, is whether the threat of aircraft terrorism and the 
presumed risk reduction of the TSA regime48 justify the infringement upon 
 
45
  See, e.g., BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS, STRAY DOGS AND VIRTUAL ARMIES: RADICALIZATION AND 
RECRUITMENT TO JIHADIST TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 9/11, at 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2011/RAND_OP343.pdf (“[D]espite al Qaeda’s intensive 
online recruiting campaign [for homegrown jihadists], their numbers remain small, their determination 
limp, and their competence poor.”) (link); HUMAN SECURITY REPORT PROJECT, HUMAN SECURITY 
BRIEF 2007, at 5 (2008), available at 
http://www.hsrgroup.org/docs/Publications/HSB2007/2007HumanSecurityBrief-FullText.pdf (link); 
NAT’L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, supra note 28, at 69–70 (concluding that al Qaeda may “decay sooner 
than many people think” and “support for terrorist networks in the Muslim world appears to be 
declining”); Scott Shane, Rethinking Our Terrorist Fears, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/weekinreview/27shane.html?pagewanted=all (noting that terrorism 
experts believe al Qaeda and its jihadist agenda are in decline in the Muslim world) (link). 
46
  Cf. John Arquilla, Op-Ed., The Coming Swarm, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/15/opinion/15arquilla.html?scp=1&sq=John Arquilla The Coming 
Swarm&st=cse (“[A] new ‘Mumbai model’ of swarming, smaller-scale terrorist violence is emerging.”) 
(link). 
47
  See Luna, supra note 15, at 115. 
48
  One can debate whether TSA efforts have reduced the threat of terrorism to passenger flights at 
all.  See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-484T, AVIATION SECURITY: TSA IS 
INCREASING PROCUREMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE ADVANCED IMAGING TECHNOLOGY, BUT 
CHALLENGES TO THIS EFFORT AND OTHER AREAS OF AVIATION SECURITY REMAIN 8–10 (2010), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10484t.pdf (link); Reinert, supra note 10, at 212–13; Grant 
Stinchfield, TSA Source: Armed Agent Slips Past DFW Body Scanner, NBC DALLAS-FORT WORTH, 
Feb. 21, 2011, http://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/TSA-Agent-Slips-Through-DFW-Body-Scanner-
With-a-Gun-116497568.html (link). 
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individual rights.  The most controversial development has been described 
by one policy expert as a “strip/grope” procedure.49  It begins with the 
TSA’s use of “Advanced Imaging Technology” (AIT), which is supposed to 
screen for both metallic and nonmetallic threats such as explosives and 
other weapons.  But as passengers pass through a booth that uses either 
millimeter wave or backscatter technology, far more is revealed than guns 
and bombs.50  These “porno scans” or “strip-search machines,” as some 
critics have labeled them, create full body images of passengers.51 
Some travelers may have no problem with their bodies being exposed 
in this manner (might exhibitionists and flashers even enjoy it?).52  Heavy 
criticism from across society, however, suggests that many people object to 
these created outlines of their naked physique, which detail breasts, 
buttocks, genitals, and other curves and crevices.53  These are the precise 
body parts one intentionally covers for reasons of personal privacy, social 
etiquette, and, not least of all, criminal liability for indecent exposure.  In an 
earlier era, these types of pictures might have been held obscene under First 
Amendment doctrine; today, the images are part of the TSA’s imposition on 
travelers, giving a new meaning to the term “federal mandate.”  The 
technology is coupled with enhanced frisks that might be hard to 
differentiate from an assaultive grope.  Professor Reinert notes several 
reported abuses, like a sixty-one-year-old bladder cancer survivor who was 
subjected to such a violent frisk that his urostomy bag broke, leaving him 
covered in his own urine.54  Other outrageous stories include an eight-
 
49
  Jim Harper, Legislation to Protect the Rights of Travelers, CATO INST., Mar. 30, 2011, 
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=12924 (link). 
50
  For what it is worth, here are pictures provided by the government as to “what TSA sees”: 
http://www.tsa.gov/graphics/images/approach/mmw_large.jpg (millimeter wave technology) (link); 
http://www.tsa.gov/graphics/images/approach/backscatter_large.jpg (backscatter technology) (link).  Far 
racier images are available on the Internet. 
51
  See Reinert, supra note 10, at 210–11; Harper, supra note 49. 
52
  On the lighter side, one passenger had written the text of the Fourth Amendment across his chest, 
which he revealed to TSA agents when he was subjected to an enhanced secondary screening.  
Apparently, the TSA agents did not find this funny; they radioed the police and had the passenger 
arrested.  Tobey v. Napolitano, No. 3:11CV154–HEH, 2011 WL 3841929, at *1–2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 30, 
2011). 
53
  Apparently, the imaging technology can also detect a woman’s sanitary napkin.  Joe Sharkey, 




  Reinert, supra note 10, at 211.  Similar stories involve mistreatment of breast cancer survivors.  
See, e.g., Brad Hyatt & Molly Grantham, After Removing Prosthetic Breast, Flight Attendant Says TSA 
Goes “Too Far”, WBTV NEWS, Nov. 18, 2010, http://www.wbtv.com/Global/story.asp?S=13534628 
(link); Breast Cancer Survivor Lori Dorn Says She Endured ‘Humiliating’ Pat-Down at JFK, CBS NEW 
YORK, Oct. 4, 2011, http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2011/10/04/breast-cancer-survivor-lori-dorn-says-she-
endured-humiliating-patdown-at-jfk/ (link). 
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month-old baby frisked by TSA agents and a ninety-five-year-old woman 
who was forced to remove her adult diaper.55 
In addition, some have claimed that TSA agents employ enhanced 
frisks in a punitive or retaliatory fashion, reserving them for those who 
object to being scanned by the new imaging machines.56  Indeed, the TSA 
appears to license heavier scrutiny of those who dispute the agency’s 
authority.  Pursuant to the “Screening Passengers by Observation 
Technique,” or “SPOT,” TSA agents are instructed to look for “behavioral 
indicators” of stress, fear, or deception.57  Of the seventy indicators, perhaps 
the most vexing and legally questionable basis for enhanced scrutiny is 
when the passenger is “[v]ery arrogant and expresses contempt against 
airport passenger procedures.”58  If nothing else, this encourages 
 
55
  Joy Jernigan, Baby Receives Pat-Down at Kansas City Airport, MSNBC, May 11, 2011, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42978267/ns/travel-news/t/baby-receives-pat-down-kansas-city-airport/ 
(link); TSA Stands by Officers After Pat-Down of Elderly Woman in Florida, CNN, June 26, 2011, 
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-26/us/florida.tsa.incident_1_pat-down-tsa-pat-downs-tsa-
officer?_s=PM:US (link).  After initially claiming that “screening procedures were followed,” TSA 
officials recently apologized for strip searches of two ailing elderly women at JFK International Airport.  
Rich Schapiro, TSA Admits Strip Search Screwup, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 18, 2012, 
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2012-01-18/news/30641168_1_tsa-agent-screeners-markey (link). 
56
  Charlie Leocha, TSA Admits to Punishing Travelers, CONSUMER TRAVELER, Aug. 24, 2010, 
http://www.consumertraveler.com/today/tsa-admits-to-punishing-travelers/ (link).  As an aside, the TSA 
recently detained U.S. Senator Rand Paul for two hours after he set off a scanner alarm and refused a 
full body pat-down.  See, e.g., Matthew Boyle, Rand Paul on TSA Detainment, DAILY CALLER, Jan. 24, 
2012, http://dailycaller.com/2012/01/23/rand-paul-on-tsa-detainment-i-was-barked-at-do-not-leave-the-
cubicle/ (link).  In theory, at least, Senator Paul’s detention could have violated the Speech or Debate 
Clause of the Constitution.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
57
  Mike M. Ahlers & Jeanne Meserve, TSA Security Looks at People Who Complain About . . . TSA 
Security, CNN, Apr. 15, 2011, 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/TRAVEL/04/15/tsa.screeners.complain/index.html?iref=allsearch (link). 
58
  Id.  For all the flying public knows, criticism of TSA agents could result in one’s inclusion on the 
federal government’s “no-fly list,” which would lead to delays and even detention during subsequent 
journeys through airport security.  As outlandish as this seems, it must be remembered that the no-fly list 
doubled in size over the past year, with about one thousand changes made to the government’s watch list 
each day.  Eileen Sullivan, U.S. No-Fly List Doubles in One Year, TIME, Feb. 2, 2012, 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2105958,00.html (link).  Compare Peter Eisler, 
Terrorist Watch List Hits 1 Million, USA TODAY, Mar. 10, 2009, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-03-10-watchlist_N.htm  (reporting that watch list had 
grown to one million names) (link), with Myth Buster: TSA’s Watch List is More than One Million 
People Strong, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.tsa.gov/approach/mythbusters/tsa_watch_list.shtm 
(disputing report) (link).  Among others, Senator Ted Kennedy was on the list, as well as Nelson 
Mandela, whose name was only removed by an Act of Congress.  Jon Hilkevitch, New Airport Security 
Rules to Require More Personal Information, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 9, 2009, 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-03-09/news/0903080245_1_no-fly-lists-personal-data-
passengers (link); Mandela Off U.S. Terrorism Watch List, CNN, July 1, 2008, 
http://articles.cnn.com/2008-07-01/world/mandela.watch_1_president-mandela-apartheid-
anc?_s=PM:WORLD (link).  It might also be noted that the SPOT program has been dogged by 
allegations of ethnic profiling.  See Joe Davidson, Lawmaker Challenges TSA on Claims of Ethnic 
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complaisance among passengers, who may submit when faced with 
questionable TSA conduct in hopes of avoiding more intense inspections or 
just to get the whole thing over with. 
Given the aforementioned risk analysis, an authoritarian strip/grope 
procedure seems hard to justify.  The current regime strikes at core 
constitutional values, including the protection of bodily autonomy and 
privacy.  In a very real sense, law-abiding citizens are treated like inmates.59  
The abuses also undermine a basic component of the rule of law—freedom 
from government caprice and vindictiveness.  The “right to defy 
submissiveness”60 lays low in the hushed silence of travelers hoping to 
avoid the ire of a TSA agent, who appears as the spitting image of the petty 
tyrant to which the Bill of Rights is addressed.  To the diminution of 
individual rights, add the billions of dollars spent on new technology and 
government personnel (and don’t forget the consumption of the travelling 
public’s valuable time).61  The cost side of the liberty/security ledger looks 
staggering when set against the minimal benefit (if any) provided by the 
TSA regime, keeping in mind that the appropriate baseline is not a security-
less, walk-straight-on-the-plane approach, but instead the pre-9/11 status 
quo62 or some other less intrusive, less expensive arrangement.63 
 
Profiling, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/lawmaker-challenges-
tsa-on-claims-of-ethnic-profiling/2011/11/28/gIQAtOiO6N_story.html (link). 
59
  See, e.g., Harper, supra note 49 (“The search that American travelers undergo at the airport is as 
intimate as what prisoners in American jail cells get.”). 
60
  Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972) (link). 
61
  Harper, supra note 49.  Balancing in this context can raise issues of commensurability and 
comparability, which are beyond the limited scope of this article.  See generally Virgílio Afonso da 
Silva, Comparing the Incommensurable: Constitutional Principles, Balancing and Rational Decision, 
31 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 273 (2011) (link); Symposium, Law and Incommensurability, 146 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1169 (1998). 
62
  The pre-9/11 techniques employed by the TSA’s predecessor, the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), included requiring passengers to pass through a magnetometer, x-raying their 
baggage, and, if necessary, subjecting them to a sweep by a hand-held metal detector or even a light pat-
down.  See, e.g., United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240, 1242–43 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(describing the history and public expectations of standard airport screening, as well as an 
unconstitutional expansion of that process) (link). 
63
  To its credit, the TSA recently unveiled new software for AIT machines that does not produce 
detailed images of an individual passenger’s body.  Press Release, Transp. Sec. Admin., TSA Takes 
Next Steps to Further Enhance Passenger Privacy (July 20, 2011), available at 
http://www.tsa.gov/press/releases/2011/0720.shtm (link). 
 
The new software automatically detects potential threats and indicates their 
location on a generic, computer-generated outline of a person that appears on a 
monitor attached to the AIT unit.  As with the current version of AIT, if a 
potential threat is detected, the area will require additional screening.  If no 
potential threats are detected, an “OK” appears on the monitor with no outline, 
and the passenger is cleared. 
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The current regime also clashes with decent understandings of the 
Fourth Amendment.  By this, I mean interpretations that take seriously the 
presumptive requirements of judicial authorization and individualized 
suspicion for government searches and seizures,64 and therefore do not 
reduce the constitutional provision to a paper right.  As mentioned in the 
introduction, Professor Reinert’s contribution provides an excellent review 
of this legal doctrine.  In particular, I agree with much of his analysis 
regarding three rubrics for evaluating the TSA regime: consent, 
reasonableness balancing, and “special needs.”  Although any number of 
thoughts and suggestions might be added to the mix, here are just a few 
points of emphasis for further discussion: 
 
 Today, commercial air travel is ubiquitous in the 
United States, with over 600 million passengers 
taking more than 9 million flights each year.65  Flying 
by plane is not merely a luxury, and it certainly is not 
some type of government privilege.  Instead, 
commercial flight is a major (and literal) vehicle of 
business, and at times it is a necessity of modern life.  
Unless society is willing to tolerate Constitution-free 
zones, or a Fourth Amendment interpretation sealed 
in pre-twentieth-century amber, a passenger cannot 




Id.  The TSA has also espoused “a more risk-based approach to secure our nation’s transportation 
systems,” implemented through a series of new airport security programs.  Terrorism and 
Transportation Security: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Transp. Sec. of the H. Comm. on 
Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 3–4 (Feb. 10, 2011) (statement of John S. Pistole, Administrator, TSA) 
(link).  However, the new software does not address concerns about abusive pat-downs, the 
effectiveness and rights implications of new schemes such as TSA’s “chat down” program, or the 
expansion of TSA checkpoints and searches to other forms of mass transportation.  See, e.g., Brian 
Bennett, TSA Screenings Aren’t Just for Airports Anymore, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2011, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/20/nation/la-na-terror-checkpoints-20111220 (link); Bart Jansen, 
Next Layer of Air Security: Chat-Downs on Top of Pat-Downs?, USA TODAY, Oct. 14, 2011, 
http://travel.usatoday.com/flights/post/2011/10/next-layer-of-air-security-chat-downs-on-top-of-pat-
downs/553721/1 (link).  Moreover, the constitutional damage may already have been done by judicial 
acceptance of the TSA’s post-9/11 regime.  See infra notes 75–76, 81–86 and accompanying text. 
64
  See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (link); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (link); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (link); Jones v. United 
States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958) (link). 
65
  TranStats, RES. & INNOVATIVE TECH. ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP., 
http://www.transtats.bts.gov/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2012) (link). 
66
  Cf. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351–52 (rejecting the notion of “constitutionally protected areas” as a 
talismanic solution to Fourth Amendment issues, noting that the defendant did not “shed his right to 
[exclude the uninvited ear] simply because he made his calls from a place where he might be seen,” and 
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 The notion that a passenger implicitly consents to 
any TSA search by entering the security queue is no 
truer than the idea that a person implicitly consents to 
government eavesdropping by using his cell phone, 
for example, or that he implicitly consents to police 
rummaging through his car and its contents simply by 
getting behind the wheel.67  The scope of consent 
obviously matters a great deal in the analysis.  It is 
one thing to x-ray a handbag or backpack, a routine 
process in various contexts beyond airport security 
(e.g., entering government buildings).  But it is quite 
another matter to create images of a passenger’s nude 
body, which would seem to be the kind of intrusive 
search that requires individualized suspicion and 
possibly judicial approval.68  In this analysis, public 
knowledge of the TSA program and the concomitant 
conditioning of the traveler’s expectations should be 
largely irrelevant.  To hold otherwise would mean 
that the government need only announce a search 
regime in order for it to be constitutional.69 
 
 In theory, airport security measures might be checked 
by the type of balancing approach adopted in Terry v. 
Ohio70 or by the “special needs” doctrine that Terry 
helped inspire.  In criminal procedure, however, the 
results of an all-things-considered weighing process 
tend to be preordained by a heavy thumb on the 
government side of the scale.  As I have written 
 
holding that a narrower interpretation would “ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to 
play in private communication”). 
67
  Cf. United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 806–07 (1974) (“To make one choose between 
flying to one’s destination and exercising one’s constitutional right [to waive consent] appears to 
us . . . in many situations a form of coercion, however subtle.”) (link); id. at 807 n.14 (“[I]f the 
government were to announce that hereafter all telephones would be tapped, perhaps to counter an 
outbreak of political kidnapings [sic], it would not justify, even after public knowledge of the 
wiretapping plan, the proposition that anyone using a telephone consented to being tapped.”); United 
States v. Kroll, 481 F.2d 884, 886 (8th Cir. 1973) (“Compelling the defendant to choose between 
exercising Fourth Amendment rights and his right to travel constitutes coercion; the government cannot 
be said to have established that the defendant freely and voluntarily consent to the search when to do 
otherwise would have meant foregoing the constitutional right to travel.”) (link). 
68
  See Reinert, supra note 10, at 223–224. 
69
  See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979) (link). 
70
  392 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1968) (link). 
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elsewhere, the constant pressure of law enforcement 
has largely eviscerated whatever safeguards Terry 
might have provided, to the point that it effectively 
stands for the proposition that officers may stop any 
person at any time for any reason, or for no reason at 
all.71  In turn, the special needs test is so malleable as 
to be little more than license for judicial adhocracy, 
evidenced by the hodgepodge of court decisions that 
often point in different directions.72  To this day, the 
line between “special” and “normal” needs of law 
enforcement remains obscure.  Moreover, it has 
always been curious (to me, at least) that a state 
actor’s inability to otherwise meet the requirements 
of the Fourth Amendment is used as an argument in 
favor of dispensing with those requirements.73 
 
Professor Reinert is spot-on when he says that the TSA’s new regime 
is “difficult to square with fundamental Fourth Amendment principles,” 
while the argument for finding it unconstitutional is “relatively 
straightforward.”74  He is also correct that the courts will feel obliged to 
uphold the regime—maybe out of deference to the post-9/11 executive 
branch or simply to avoid the appearance of impeding efforts to prevent 
terrorism—while distorting search and seizure doctrine as needed along the 
way.  This past July, the D.C. Circuit held that the use of AIT scanners did 
not violate the Fourth Amendment.75  The court labeled passenger screening 
as an administrative search, which only requires that the governmental 
interest in safety outweighs the passenger’s interest in privacy.  “That 
balance clearly favors the Government here,” the panel concluded, noting 
that the AIT scanners can detect non-metallic explosives, the images 
produced are “distort[ed]” and immediately deleted, and passengers may 
 
71
  Erik Luna, Hydraulic Pressures and Slight Deviations, 2009 CATO S. CT. REV. 133, 140 (link); 
see also Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D., at 2, Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 01034 (SAS) 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2010), available at  http://ccrjustice.org/files/Expert_Report_JeffreyFagan.pdf 
(finding that the New York City Police Department employs Terry stops in a racially discriminatory 
manner) (link). 
72
  See, e.g., Erik Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DUKE L.J. 787, 876–88 (1999) (link); cf. 
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 639 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
special needs doctrine turns search and seizure law into a “patchwork quilt”) (link). 
73
  See, e.g., O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 724–25 (1987) (link); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 
U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (link). 
74
  Reinert, supra note 10, at 209. 
75
  Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (link).  
Several challenges to the use of AIT scanners (as well as aggressive pat-downs) have been dismissed 
pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 46110, which provides federal appellate courts exclusive jurisdiction to review 
TSA orders.  See Roberts v. Napolitano, 798 F. Supp. 2d 7, 10–11 (D.D.C. 2011) (link). 
106: 230 (2012) The Bin Laden Exception 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2012/3/ 245 
choose to be frisked instead.76  The opinion’s terse analysis of a highly 
contentious issue in a high-profile case speaks volumes about the level of 
deference that the TSA will receive from the courts. 
As such, Professor Reinert’s instinct—preventing gratuitous damage to 
the Fourth Amendment—is laudable.  Moreover, his proposed doctrinal 
limitation is quite attractive, calling for the suppression of evidence found 
during special needs searches in ensuing prosecutions unrelated to the 
special need itself.77  For instance, a bag of marijuana uncovered during the 
TSA screening process would be excluded from a subsequent drug case.  
Actually, I would like to apply this doctrinal move more generally as a 
(partial) solution to the most troubling forms of pretextual investigations, 
such as police detentions ostensibly for minor infractions (e.g., most traffic 
stops) used as an excuse to search for more serious but unrelated offenses 
(e.g., scouring a vehicle to find drugs). 
Unfortunately, these types of proposals face significant hurdles in 
existing caselaw.78  Professor Reinert notes that the Supreme Court has not 
decided the question of “whether an administrative search regime that 
routinely generated evidence for prosecution could be upheld under ‘special 
needs.’”79  In order to avert evidentiary suppression, a negative answer 
might simply force the judiciary to rely upon a different doctrine, including 
those grounds that Reinert believes to be more disruptive of search and 
seizure principles (i.e., consent and reasonableness balancing).  This is not 
just idle speculation, however.  Far from broadening the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule, the Roberts Court has chipped away at this 
rule with the apparent goal of eliminating it altogether.80 
Given post-9/11 terrorism anxieties, it is unsurprising that anti-
exclusionary rule sentiments are particularly powerful in the context of 
airport security.  For example, two recent appellate court decisions—one 
federal and the other state—upheld TSA searches that uncovered evidence 
of child pornography in checked baggage.81  In each case, agents opened the 
 
76
  Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 10. 
77
  See Reinert, supra note 10, at 220–25. 
78
  See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811–12 (1996) (refusing to invalidate a traffic 
stop as a pretextual investigation) (link); United States v. McCarty, 648 F.3d 820, 830–31 (9th Cir. 
2011) (link); United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 617 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The mere fact that a 
screening procedure ultimately reveals contraband other than weapons or explosives does not render it 
unreasonable, post facto.”) (link); 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.6(h) 5 (4th ed. 2004). 
79
  Reinert, supra note 10, at 228 n.109. 
80
  See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427–29 (2011) (link); Herring v. United States, 555 
U.S. 135, 139–48 (2009) (link); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 590–94 (2006) (link). 
81
  See McCarty, 648 F.3d at 823–24; Higerd v. State, 54 So. 3d 513, 515 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010), 
reh’g denied (Feb. 4, 2011), review denied 64 So. 3d 1260 (Fla. 2011) and cert. denied, 132 S. Ct 521 
(2011) (link). 
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baggage and removed a folder containing documents, which they then 
inspected, supposedly looking for thin, flat charges known as “sheet 
explosives.”  Photographs found in the respective folders served as the basis 
for subsequent criminal prosecutions.  Both appellate decisions agreed that 
the agents had conducted an administrative search that requires neither a 
warrant nor individualized suspicion, because it was “no more extensive nor 
intensive than necessary, in the light of current technology, to detect the 
presence of weapons or explosives” and was “confined in good faith to that 
purpose.”82 
This federal decision is troubling on a number of fronts.  In effect, TSA 
agents may now search any and all items in one’s baggage, given the 
sweeping claim that explosives “may be disguised as a simple piece of 
paper or cardboard, and may be hidden in just about anything, including a 
laptop, book, magazine, deck of cards, or packet of photographs.”83  
Moreover, evidence of an agent’s impermissible motive—for instance, 
searching a bag for contraband wholly unrelated to terrorist threats—will be 
ignored so long as the TSA’s “programmatic motive” is airline safety.84  
The appellate panel also engaged in a very un-appellate-like parsing of the 
record, scrutinizing the district court’s assessments of witness credibility, 
refusing to afford the usual deference to a trial judge’s factual findings, and 
even (lightly) reprimanding their lower court colleague.85 
The federal case may foreshadow judicial acquiescence to the entire 
TSA search regime, including the type of intrusive searches discussed 
above and all the figurative baggage they carry.  To my mind, however, it 
was the state court decision that was most telling.  After accepting the 
predictable arguments in favor of the search in question, the court offered 
an alternative rationale to deny the suppression motion: the damning 
evidence was admissible pursuant to the “good faith exception” to the 
warrant requirement, based on the assumption that a reasonably well-trained 
TSA agent would not have known that the search was illegal.86  At a 
minimum, this claim fits uncomfortably with the federal appellate court’s 
refusal to inquire into an agent’s actual motives for conducting a search.  
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But it does demonstrate a readiness to find a constitutional exception for 
post-9/11 airport security and, more generally, antiterrorism measures 
designed to prevent another attack. 
CONCLUSION 
In the end, I just wish everyone would be a bit more honest.  What is at play 
here is not a previously recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment—
consent, good faith, special needs, and so on—but instead an entirely new 
exemption from otherwise applicable requirements, driven by an abiding 
fear of al Qaeda and its now-deceased kingpin rather than a reasoned 
assessment of terrorism-related risks.  Let’s call it what it is: The Bin Laden 
Exception to the Constitution.  If nothing else, putting a name to the 
systematic evasion of the nation’s most hallowed legal text might force 
some to face their own irrationality and question the wisdom of bending the 
Constitution, as well as spilling vast amounts of blood and treasure, all for 
the sake of one evil man and his outlaw organization. 
